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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18219 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Mary v. Holloway, was charged with 
second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-203 (1973), as amended, and was tried 
before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury found appellant guilty of second-degree 
murder, and the trial court sentenced her to an indeterminate 
term of not less than five years, and which may be for life, 
in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's 
convict ion. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
on March 13, 1981, following marital disagreements, 
the victim, Samuel Beare, temporarily occupied an apartment 
which was then in possession of the appellant, Mary Holloway, 
and Charles L. Crick (T. 239). The apartment is located at 
269 Kelsey Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 239). Prior to 
the victim's change in address, the friendship between the 
appellant and the victim had deteriorated to such a point that 
appellant told a friend that she and Charles Crick hated the 
victim and intended to kill him (T. 114-116, 124). 
During the evening of March 14, 1981, Charles Crick, 
the appellant and the victim were in the Kelsey Avenue 
apartment drinking alcoholic beverages and watching television 
(T. 241). Later that evening, Charles Crick left to pick up 
his laundry and he returned to the apartment at approximately 
12:00 midnight, accompanied by Tommy Garcia, an acquaintance 
(T. 241). Shortly thereafter and apparently following a 
heated argument, the appellant, Tommy Garcia, and Charles 
Crick attacked the victim in the apartment bedroom (T. 242, 
243). Charles Crick choked the victim until he was nearly 
unconscious, whereupon the appellant grabbed his head, yanked 
it back, and told him to plead for his life (T. 134, 156). 
The appellant, along with the others, then hit the victim's 
head with glass beer mugs (T. 156). Charles Crick continued 
the vicious, cowardly attack on the helpless vi.ctim by hitting 
-2-
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him in the head with a bar of teak wood (T. 156). Following 
the beating, a knife was produced, and the appellant, Charles 
Crick and Tommy Garcia each took turns stabbing the victim, 
inflicting fifteen separate wounds, each wound seven to eight 
inches deep (T. 157, 196, 199). 
The victim died at about 2:00 a.m. on March 15, 1981 
(T. 199, 158, 3). 
Following the murder, the victim's body was placed 
in the back seat of a car1 and, with Charles Crick at the 
wheel and the appellant and Tommy Garcia as passengers, the 
body was transported to 1400 East Sunnyside Avenue where the 
car was parked near a street light (T. 3, 158, 261). Moments 
later, Ryan Nielsen, a University of Utah police officer who 
had finished his night shift at 2:00 a.m., drove by the car 
ain noticed its three occupants standing nearby (T. 2, 3). 
Becoming suspicious, Officer Nielsen turned his car around and 
drove eastbound along Sunnyside Avenue passing the car and its 
occupants again (T. 4). Following another U-turn, Officer 
Nielsen proceeded westbound along Sunnyside Avenue and as he 
passed the car a third time he observed Tommy Garcia pulling 
the victim's body from the car (T. 4, 5, 245). Seeking help, 
Officer Nielsen drove to a 7-Eleven store located at 800 South 
1300 East, informed the clerk of the situation and asked him 
to call the police (T. 5). 
-3-
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In the meantime, the car containing the murderers 
passed the 7-Eleven store heading westbound on 800 South, and 
Officer Nielsen followed it (T. 5). The car containing 
appellant malfunctioned and it stopped at 500 East 800 South 
(T. 6). As the appellant and the two other occupants 
investigated the problem, Officer Nielsen approached their 
car, identified himself, and told them to lie on the ground 
(T. 7). All three complied with his order (T. 7). Moments 
later, however, Tommy Garcia jumped up and ran from Officer 
Nielsen (T. 7, 246). Before pursuing Garcia, he told 
appellant and Charles Crick that they were under arrest and 
that they were to stay on the ground (T. 8). Officer Nielsen 
then pursued Tommy Garcia, apprehending him minutes later. In 
the meantime, appellant and Charles Crick fled on foot, 
returning to their apartment (T. 8, 247). 
Following further police investigation, appellant 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A MANSLAUGHTER 
JURY INSTRUCTION. 
At the conclusion of trial in a hearing outside the 
presence of the jury, appellant requested a manslaughter jury 
-4-
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instruction (T. 290). The trial court rejected the proffered 
instruction and appellant took exception (T. 295). 
On her appeal, appellant argues that the facts in 
the record rationally supported a finding that her conduct 
fell within the purview of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-205 (1973), 
as amended, as a lesser included offense, and that the trial 
court's refusal to issue the request~d manslaughter 
instruction constituted reversible error. Alternatively, 
appellant argues that she, as a defendant in a criminal case, 
had a right to submit her theory to the jury in the form of 
instructions, and that the trial court's failure to submit the 
requested manslaughter instruction denied her that right. 
A. APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN 
INSTRUCTION ON MANSLAUGHTER AS A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on 
a lesser included offense "unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged 
and convicting him of the included offense." Utah Code Ann., 
§ 76-1-402(4) (1973), as amended. Since manslaughter is a 
lesser included offense of second-degree murder, see Farrow v. 
Smith, Utah, 541 P.2d 1107, 1109 (1975)~ cf. State v. Norman, 
Utah, 580 P.2d 237 (1978), the issue in the case at bar 
becomes whether or not the facts provided a rational basis 
-5-
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for a verdict acquitting the appellant of second-degree murder 
and convicting her of manslaughter. 
Analysis that would be helpful in resolving this 
issue is found in State v. Dougherty, Utah, 550 P.2d 175 
(1976). There, the defendant was charged with unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance. During 
trial, an undercover agent testified that an intermediary made 
the initial arrangements for the future purchase of narcotics 
from the defendant. Once the arrangements were completed, the 
undercover agent, with the intermediary present, purchased the 
narcotics from the defendant. The intermediary, however, 
testified that the defendant was not present during the 
transaction and that the agent purchased the drugs directly 
from the intermediary. At the close of his trial and relying 
upon Utah Code Ann., S 77-33-6 (1953), as amended, the 
predecessor to S 76-1-402(4), the defendant requested the 
trial court issue an instruction on the lesser included 
offense of possession of a controlled substance. The trial 
court ref used to issue this instruction and the defendant was 
convicted of the greater offense. Following his conviction, 
the defendant appealed, assigning as error the lower court's 
refusal to issue the requested jury instruction. 
The Dougherty court began its analysis of 
appellant's claim by stating that a defendant does not have an 
absolute right to instructions on lesser included offenses, 
-~ 
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but that the right only attaches when the evidence and 
circumstances justify. Id. at 1761 and, when addressing this 
issue, the Court: 
will survey the evidence, and the 
inferences which admit of a rational 
deduction, to determine if there exists 
reasonable basis upon which a conviction 
of the lesser included offense could rest. 
Id. at 176. This Court further noted that issues concerning 
lesser included offenses arose in three situations: 
First, where there is evidence which would 
absolve the defendant from guilt of a 
greater offense, or degree, but would 
support a finding of guilt of a lesser 
offense, or degree1 the instruciton is 
mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would not 
support a finding of guilt in the 
commission of the lesser offense or 
degree. For example, the defendant denies 
any complicity in the crime charged, and 
thus lays no foundation for any 
intermediate verdict. • • • This second 
situation renders an instruction on a 
lesser included offense erroneous, because 
it is not pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation. One 
where the elements of the greater offense 
include all the elements of the lesser 
offense1 because, by its very nature, the 
greater offense could not have been 
committed without defendant having the 
intent in doing the acts, which constitute 
the lesser offense. In such a situation 
instructions on the lesser included 
offense may be given, because all elements 
of the lesser offense have been proved. 
However, such an instruction ma ro erl 
be re use i t e prosecution has met its 
-7-
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burden of proof on the greater offense, 
and there is no evidence tending to reduce 
the greater offense. 
Id. at 176, 177 (Emphasis added). Affirming defendant's 
conviction, this Court held that the defense testimony could 
only prove complete innocence, and thus he was not entitled to 
an instruction on the lesser included offense because the 
evidence in the record shows he could only be found guilty or 
not guilty of the offense charged. Id. at 177. 
Although Dougherty dealt with § 77-33-6, the earlier 
included offense statute, the appropriateness of its analysis 
under the purview of § 76-1-402(4), the current lesser 
included offense statute, was ratified by this Court in State 
v. Chestnut, Utah, 621 P.2d 1228 (1980). 
More recently, the issue of a trial court's refusal 
to grant a requested jury instruction on a lesser included 
offense was addressed by this Court in State v. Elliott, Utah, 
641 P.2d 122 (1982). There, the defendants were charged with 
/ 
the offense of aggravated sexual assault and convicted of the 
offense of forcible sodomy. Following conviction, the 
defendants appealed, asserting that the trial court erred when 
it refused to issue requested instructions on either assault 
or aggravated assault. Addressing this claim, this Court 
concluded that the lesser offenses of assault and aggravated 
assault were included within the offense of aggravated sexual 
assault. Furthermore, this Court found that evidence had been 
-8-
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adduced at trial which established a rational basis for a 
verdict of acquittal on the crime charged and for a conviction 
on the offenses of assault or aggravated assault. Critical to 
the establishment of the reational basis and to this court's 
subsequent reversal of the conviction was defendant's 
testimony "wherein they readily admitted the commission of the 
assault, but denied the commission of sodomy or the intent to 
commit sodomy." Id. at 124 n. 14 (emphasis added). 
Viewing the record in the instant case, appellant's 
attack upon her conviction must fail because there exists no 
evidence that would support a finding of guilt for 
manslaughter. The manslaughter statute, § 76-5-205, requires 
that the actor so convicted must have at least caused or 
recklessly caused the death of another. During trial, 
however, appellant maintained that Tommy Garcia was solely 
responsible for the victim's death and that she merely stood 
in the bedroom corner while the vicious attack occurred, 
pleading with Charles Crick to i~tercede in the victim's 
behalf (T. 244). Furthermore, she testified that she was 
forced to accompany Tommy Garcia as he disposed of the 
victim's body (T. 245). She also stated that when they 
arrived at their destination she remained in the car, and that 
after Garcia removed the victim he returned covered with blood 
and holding a knife (T. 246). Even during closing argument 
appellant maintains her innocence, claiming that there existed 
no evidence pointing to her involvement in the murder. Thus, 
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under the Dougherty rule, the issuance of a manslaughter 
instruction at appellant's trial would have been erroneous 
because appellant denied any complicity in the victim's murder 
and laid no foundation for an intermediate verdict. See also: 
State v. Burrow, 221 Kan. 754, 561 P.2d 864 (1977) (held that 
the lower court properly refused appellant's requested 
manslaughter instructions because appellant testified that 
they had not participated in any unlawful killing). 
Furthermore, the instant case also falls within the 
third category summarized in Dougherty, supra, because 
respondent met its burden of proof for second-degree murder 
and there was no evidence tending to reduce the crime to 
manslaughter. Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-203(l)(a) (1973), as 
amended, provides that "[c]riminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the second degree if the actor: Intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another •••• " The evidence adduced at 
trial overwhelmingly supports appellant's guilty verdict for 
second-degree murder. Prior to the murder, appellant, with 
Charles Crick present, told Lillian Archuleta that they hated 
the victim and intended to kill him (T. 116). Furthermore, on 
the morning following the murder, with two visitors present, 
appellant recounted in detail the events that led to the 
victim's death (T. 130, et seq.: 150, et. seq.): 
specifically, appellant had grabbed the victim's head and made 
-10-
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him plead for his life1 she had struck the victim's head with 
a beer mug1 and finally, she had taken turns with the two 
other murderers stabbing the victim with a knife, producing 
fifteen wounds, each of which was fatal. The only reasonable 
interpretation to this horrendous sequence of events is that 
appellant either intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
of the victim and was thus guilty of second-degree murder. 
In addition, there exist no facts indicating that 
appellant could have been convicted of manslaughter. 
Appellant argues, however, that the following facts support an 
inference that she was reckless and thus entitled to a 
manslaughter instruction: she did ·not participate in the 
initial confrontation between Tommy Garcia and the victim; she 
had been drinking the. evening the victim died; she had no 
blood on her person; and she was only a passenger in the car 
that transported the victim's body. None of these alleged 
facts separately or collectively would tend to reduce the 
offense from second-degree murder to manslaughter. Assuming 
that appellant's testimony is true, the fact that she did not 
participate in the initial argument between Tommy Garcia and 
the victim does not change the legal effect of her subsequent 
conduct--the fatal stabbing of the victim. Also, the fact 
that no blood was found on appellant's body is insignificant 
since the evidence adduced at trial indicates that Tommy 
Garcia placed the body in and removed it from the car. 
Equally insignificant is the fact that appellant was merely 
-11-
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a passenger in the car carrying the victim's body because this 
fact in no way supports an inference that appellant recklessly 
caused the victim's death. Finally, mere consumption of 
alcohol before the commission of the crime does not tend to 
reduce that crime from second-degree murder to manslaughter. 
In State v. Sisneros, Utah, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (1981), this 
Court, in construing Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-306 (1973), as 
amended, the voluntary intoxication statute, adopted as 
consistent therewith the following statement: 
Under the law, a state of voluntary 
intoxication from alcohol is not a defense 
to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication is of such degree or state as 
to negate the existence of the mental 
state which is an element of the offense. 
Neither testimony nor any other facts in the record support a 
conclusion that appellant was so inebriated that she was 
unable to form the requisite intent for second-degree murder. 
Appellant's consumption level w~~ not sufficient to negate the 
mental state for second-degree murder and thus this fact does 
not tend to reduce the offense to manslaughter. 
Therefore, under Dougherty, supra, and § 
76-1-402(4), appellant was not entitled to her requested 
manslaughter instruction and thus the trial court did not 
commit error in denying her request. 
-12-
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B. APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION ON HER THEORY 
OF THE CASE. 
A defendant is entitled to the issuance of jury 
instructions that present his theory of the case. State v. 
Torres, Utah, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (1980). This entitlement is 
not absolute, however, but is predicated upon the existence of 
evidence providing a reasonable basis that justifies giving 
the requested instructions. State v. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d 
1211, 1213 (1980). Furthermore, a defendant is not entitled 
to the presentiment of a new theory through jury instructions 
when that theory is wholly inconsistent with the theory the 
defendant actually proffered during trial. See State v. 
Stone, Utah, 629 P.2d 442 (1981). 
Based upon the foregoing authority, appellant was 
not entitled to a manslaughter instruction as her theory of 
the case. The facts as found in the record and summarized in 
the Statement of Facts and Point/I-A, supra, clearly indicate 
that there does not exist a scintilla of evidence providing a 
rational basis that would have justified the issuance of a 
manslaughter instruction. Furthermore, appellant's theory 
relied upon during trial was that she din not participate in 
the acts that led to the victim's death. This theory is 
wholly inconsistent with a manslaughter theory that at least 
requires the defendant to have caused the death of the victim. 
-13-
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Therefore, appellant was not entitled under this rubric to a 
manslaughter instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is devoid of evidence justifying 
appellant's claim that the trial court erred when it refused 
to issue the requested manslaughter instruction. Therefore, 
respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
appellant's conviction for second-degree murder. 
1982 •. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A~n~l~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Ronald J. 
Yengich, Attorney for Appellant, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, this 29th day of October, 1982. 
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